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AbstrAct: one standard way to conceive value is in terms of  properties, as g.E. moore does 
when he argues that goodness is a “simple and indefinable” property. those who advocate this 
property conception of  value often draw an analogy with color. the analogy with color is infor-
mative, but since these accounts typically get color wrong, they also get value wrong. instead 
of  being conceived as properties simply predicated of  objects, colors should be conceived as 
relations between subjects and objects in viewing contexts. similarly, as evolutionary naturalism 
makes clear, value is relational in that it is constituted by a relation between object, subject and 
context, and is grounded on “mattering”. this relational account of  value has an advantage 
over the property conception of  value because it better explains actual ethical behavior. But 
most importantly, it gets valuation right, revealing all the important factors, and making clear 
how values are subjective—dependent on the nature of  the subject, but still objective—ground-
ed on the facts about mattering. 
Keywords: meta-ethics, values, Evolutionary naturalism, color, Properties, relations, moore
introduction
in the introduction to his Evolutionary Naturalism, michael ruse admitted that evo-
lutionary ethics was commonly regarded as “positively unclean.” (ruse:1995:9) this 
attitude toward evolutionary ethics is hardly surprising. many evolutionists believe that 
ethical systems and moral sentiments are ultimately nothing more than evolutionary 
adaptations that help humans live together in relative harmony. ruse explains:
We think that we ought to do certain things and that we ought not to do other 
things, because this is our biology’s way of  making us break from our usual selfish 
or self-interested attitudes and to get on with the job of  cooperating with others… 
morality is no more—although certainly no less—than an adaptation, and as such 
has the same status as such things as teeth and eyes and noses. (ruse:1995:241) 
this implies, according to ruse and others,1 that there are no absolute moral values 
serving as foundation for our beliefs about what is morally right and wrong, and there-
1. see also ruse and Wilson, (1986) ruse (1986a, 1986b) and Joyce (2000).
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fore, the human tendency to believe in moral absolutes can be explained away as an 
adaptive error foisted upon us by our evolutionary past. (ruse:1995:248-9) i will not 
here challenge these “unclean” conclusions. i believe they are largely correct. and we 
should thank evolutionary theory for revealing these sorts of  errors for what they are! 
But there is another more positive side to error theory: what we know about evolution 
can reveal a common logical error we make about valuation, and how to correct that 
error.
the now standard starting point for evolutionary ethicists is the position ruse advo-
cates and describes as “evolutionary naturalism.” this position has two main com-
ponents. first, there is a substantive assumption that since humans are the products 
of  evolution by natural selection, evolutionary theory can help us understand them 
and their behaviors. (ruse:1995:7) second, there is a methodological assumption—the 
“naturalism” in evolutionary naturalism. ruse again: “naturalism for me…means try-
ing to understand through empirical law. this means that you have got to appeal to 
experience—you cannot just think things through a priori…” (ruse:1995:2) naturalism 
is, in this sense, a commitment to understanding human nature through scientific 
investigation. 
for the evolutionary naturalist, an important source of  insight comes from what we 
know about the evolutionary processes that produced modern humans. one approach 
looks for insights into human nature through particular adaptation hypotheses about 
social behavior. this is an appropriate and often promising strategy. But what i want 
to focus on here does not get grounded on any particular adaptation hypothesis. it is 
grounded on the most basic commitments of  evolutionary theory. the concept of  fit-
ness, i will argue, is the fundamental valuational concept—for humans and all other 
creatures—and it implies that valuation is relational and subjective, yet still objective in 
important ways. in short, evolution tells us that values are complex relational facts. 
to make my case, i will begin by identifying where standard conceptions of  valu-
ation go wrong—by trying to conceive value in terms of  simple predication and prop-
erties. second, i will explain how evolutionary fitness reveals the relational structure 
of  valuation. third will be a sketch of  how ethical values might fit into this relational 
structure. fourth, i will distinguish this approach from similar accounts of  value and 
defend it from some obvious objections. fifth, i will sketch out an error theory in terms 
of  logical structure. finally i will summarize the advantages of  the relational view, and 
outline some possible philosophical implications. in the end, i hope to have shown that 
the relational conception of  valuation not only gets the logical structure of  valuation 
right, but it also provides the basis for a framework that can better explain our actual 
moral beliefs, practices and sentiments. 
i. thE rEcEivEd viEW: valuEs as ProPErtiEs
the problem with standard conceptions of  valuation and values at issue here is at 
bottom logical, but it is manifested in many different ways of  conceiving value. standard 
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conceptions sometimes go wrong by conceiving value propositions in terms of  simple 
predications like “x is good”. one influential approach begins with this structure and 
conceives values in terms of  properties. g. E. moore does this in his Principia Ethica, 
where he argues that appeals to natural properties like pleasure and happiness in defin-
ing goodness commit the “naturalistic fallacy.” his basis for this conclusion is the “open 
question” argument: goodness cannot be defined in terms of  natural properties because 
for any natural property or set of  properties, it is an open question whether it is good 
in any particular case. (moore:15) moore concludes that goodness must be a simple, 
indefinable property. 
(1) the peculiarity of  Ethics is not that it investigates assertions about human 
conduct, but that it investigates assertions about that property of  things which 
is denoted by the term ‘good,’ and the converse property denoted by the term 
‘bad.’… (2) this property, by reference to which the subject-matter of  Ethics must 
be defined, is itself  simple and indefinable. (moore:36)
moore is not alone in thinking about value in property terms. many of  those engaged 
in the debates about naturalism and non-naturalism, intuitionism and realism adopt 
similar stances. in one recent ethics textbook, for instance, the author claims that: 
“moral realism commits itself  to the existence of  external, independent moral proper-
ties.” (demarco:258) and in criticising ruse, rottschaefer and martinsen give an evo-
lutionary account that also conceives value in terms of  properties.2
We have adopted a non-reductionist account of  the moral realm, according to 
which the moral properties of  persons and things, moral rightness and goodness, 
are distinct from natural non-moral properties because they supervene on the 
latter. (rottschaefer and martinsen:398)
similarly, John mcdowell, in his influential “values and secondary Properties,” argues 
that moral properties are analogous to “secondary properties” like colors. (mcdowell) 
in doing so, mcdowell is following the lead of  moore, who had drawn a similar anal-
ogy to color perception:
there is… no intrinsic difficulty in the contention that ‘good’ denotes a simple and 
indefinable quality. there are many other instances of  such qualities. consider 
yellow, for example. We may try to define it, by describing its physical equivalent; 
we may state what kind of  light-vibrations must stimulate the normal eye, in order 
that we may perceive it. But a moment’s reflection is sufficient to shew that those 
light vibrations are not themselves what we mean by yellow. they are not what 
we perceive... the most that we can be entitled to say of  those vibrations is that 
they are what corresponds in space to the yellow which we actually perceive. yet 
a mistake of  this simple kind has commonly been made about ‘good.’ it may be 
true that all things which are good are also something else, just as it is true that all 
2. sometimes rottschaefer and martinsen describe values as relations, which would seem to be more in 
conformity with the view that i will be advocating, but they are unclear what the relation is supposed to 
be, and often they seem to interpret it as a relation between properties—supervenience. Whatever the case, 
mostly they identify values as properties.
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things which are yellow produce a certain kind of  vibration in the light. and it is 
a fact, that Ethics aims at discovering what are those other properties belonging to 
all things which are good. (moore:10) 
the color analogy, drawn also by others,3 is right in an important respect. But since 
moore gets color perception wrong, he also gets valuation wrong. how he gets color 
perception wrong is instructive in understanding how he, and others who adopt this 
property approach, generally get valuation wrong.
Ever since galileo and locke, colors have typically been conceived as secondary 
properties, and distinguished from primary properties such as shape and size. usually, 
it is claimed that primary properties are independent of  the subject, while secondary 
properties are not. (hilbert:3-5) the shape of  an object, for instance, does not depend 
on any facts about the observer. colors, on the other hand, depend on the observer hav-
ing the right constitution and being in the right environment—nothing is really yellow 
in absolute darkness or to a blind man. What is right about this conception of  color that 
color perception is subjective—dependent on facts about the perceiver.4 What is wrong 
is the attempt to conceive of  color as nonetheless still a property of  the object. this 
implies that the property is somehow both in the object and the subject. the object is 
yellow, but the yellowness is in the subject. Barry maund begins his book on color with 
this ‘duality’ problem:
the status of  colour has for long been puzzling. almost everyone agrees that 
physical objects have colours: that sunsets are golden or red; that bananas are 
yellow; that claret is purple; and so on. Everyone agrees that objects are perceived 
as coloured. Where there is disagreement is over the nature of  the colour physical 
objects have and the nature of  the colour we perceive objects as having, and 
indeed whether the two are the same. (maund:195:xiii)
there have been many diverse attempts to make sense out of  this picture. maund 
believes he has a solution to this puzzle in his (perhaps even more puzzling) conception 
of  color as a “virtual property”: “an intrinsic, nonrelational property of  physical objects, 
but one which no object in the actual world has.” (maund:1995:xiii) most of  the other 
attempts to make sense out of  this ‘duality’ of  color—as being in both the object and 
subject—similarly conceive colors as properties, in various ways as: objective, irreduc-
ible and supervenient; objective and reducible; dispositional relative to light; disposi-
tional relative to physical response; dispositional relative to appearance; or dispositional 
relative to functional role. (maund:2002:4) 
i can hardly evaluate all these property theories here. But a simple solution to the 
duality problem is to be found in the insight that color perception is relational: an 
3. see darwall, gibbard and railton for a survey of  metaethical approaches that indicates the range of  
thinkers who draw the analogy between color and value, and conceive of  values as properties, 
4. some see color as purely subjective. in a recent textbook on perception, michael W. levine argues: “as 
real as color seems, it is, in fact, a purely psychological phenomenon. light rays are not colored; they are 
radiations of  electromagnetic energy of  different wavelengths. the attribute called ‘color’ is entirely a 
fabrication of  your visual system. (levine: 297) 
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object has a particular color only relative to certain perceiver under certain conditions. 
in absolute darkness nothing is really yellow. in red light everything is red. and for those 
who lack all color vision entirely, nothing is ever a color in the ordinary sense. Evan 
thompson’s “ecological” approach is relational in this sense. according to thompson, 
color is always relative to a perceiver and a “photic environment,”5 and there are there-
fore no “absolute”, non-relational facts about color. (thompson:2000:179-180) What 
this implies is that colors are not properties simply predicated of  objects. in other words, 
“that banana is yellow” does not have a logical structure that accurately reflects color 
perception. a color predication that more accurately reflects perception, would involve 
a relation among an object, a subject that perceives the object, and the conditions under 
which the subject perceives the object. We can schematize this relational logical struc-
ture in the following schema:
Relational Color Schema: “w is color x for y in context(s) z.”
here w is an object, x is a color term, y is a person or persons, and z is a description of, 
or reference to, a particular context. 
there are two advantages to thinking about color in this relational way. first, it 
gets color and color perception right. colors exist because of  how the visual systems 
of  subjects (organisms) interact with objects in the world. this fact is universally recog-
nized and is the basis for the duality problem described by maund above. thinking of  
colors as properties of  objects, rather than relations, simply misrepresents colors and 
color perception. second, the relational schema provides a framework that allows us to 
actually say something about actual patterns of  color perception. depending on our 
purposes, we can specify human color perception relative to ideal viewing conditions 
and ideal viewers, or, to the many ways that “normal” human vision varies. We can also 
adopt an evolutionary perspective and understand color perception in other species 
and how it functions relative to survival and reproduction. if  we think of  colors simply 
as properties of  objects, we can say little about the many differences in how subjects 
perceive color.
What psychophysicists have discovered about human color vision, is that there is 
more variability than we might suppose. human color vision is normally trichromatic, 
based on the presence of  three kinds of  cones, each with a different absorption spec-
trum. deviations from normal color vision include the total absence of  color vision 
found in monochromats, or the limited color vision found in dichromats, who lack one 
of  the three kinds of  cones, and are therefore are unable to distinguish some colors 
distinguishable by trichromats. dichromats who lack the “green” cone (deuteranops), 
for instance, cannot distinguish green from red, or green from blue. (coren:102) on the 
other hand, tetrachromats, who have four kinds of  cones, and consequently an addition-
al absorption spectrum, can distinguish more colors than can trichromats. (coren:105) 
When confronted with a visible color spectrum, trichromats can typically identify 7 
5. thompson explains: “thus i hold that color, rather than being distal in the physicalist sense, is relational: 
having a surface color is equivalent to having a ssr that belongs to a certain chromatic equivalence class 
for a particular perceiver in its photic environment.” (thompson:2000:179) 
	 COSMOS	AND	HISTORY	 275
or 8 distinct color bands, while dichromats will identify only 5 or 6, but tetrachromats 
will identify around 10. (coren:108) But even among the “normal” trichromats, there 
is significant variability in terms of  the respective absorption spectra, and abilities to 
distinguish color. and in “anomalous trichromats,” there is an even more extreme vari-
ability, resulting in significant differences in the ability to identify and distinguish colors. 
and in one striking case, a subject had one eye that was trichromatic, while the other 
was dichromatic. it was possible to determine, through color matching, that when the 
trichromatic eye saw green, yellow, orange or red, the dichromatic eye saw only yellow. 
and when the trichromatic eye saw violet or blue, the dichromatic eye saw only blue. 
(coren:103) 
What this all suggests is that among humans, and even “normal” humans, color 
perception is highly variable and dependent on the subject. But there is even more 
variability if  we look to non-human subjects. tetrachromacy is common among verte-
brates, including birds, fishes, amphibians and reptiles. and there is sensitivity among 
vertebrates, especially birds, to ultraviolet wavelengths:
avian color vision is more complex than our own because it is at least tetrachromatic, 
perhaps even pentachromatic. it uses more of  the available spectrum because 
its visual sensitivity and wavelength discrimination extend considerably into the 
ultraviolet (uv) region (300-400nm). (thompson:2000:175)
this implies, according to thompson, that a thing can have different colors to different 
perceivers.
…Because colors are perceiver relative, the same thing can simultaneously have 
different colors. for example, the surface of  an object can be color one color to me 
and a different color to a tetrachromatic pigeon. (thompson:2000:180)
it is unclear how the property conception can make sense out of  all these varying pat-
terns of  color perception among humans and other species. the bottom line is that on 
this relational conception of  color, and unlike the property conception, we can actually 
say something about the circumstances under which something can be a particular 
color to someone. and we can explicitly recognize all of  the factors operating in color percep-
tion. this is an important advantage of  the relational conception of  color. conceiving 
of  color as a property—even as a supervenient property—simply suppresses important 
factors in color perception.6 little is to be gained from this.
it is worth noting that the relational nature of  color perception cannot be avoided 
by appealing to causal dispositions. on this strategy, we would identify the color of  an 
object with its causal disposition (perhaps by virtue of  its primary properties) to produce 
the perception of  a particular color in normally sighted humans under standard view-
ing conditions. color would then be identified with a simple property—a causal disposi-
6. it is beyond the scope of  this paper to say how supervenience in all its versions is inadequate. that would 
be a daunting project. What i hope to do here is make an end run around all the philosophical contortions 
designed to make supervenience adequate, and show that the relational approach does the job. 
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tion.7 in this case we could translate “x is yellow” into something like “x has the causal 
disposition to produce a perception of  yellow under normal conditions for normally 
sighted humans”. the causal disposition would then just be whatever properties caused 
this tendency to produce the relevant kind of  color perception. But by now it should be 
apparent that causal dispositions are relational. a yellow flower may have the power to 
produce a perception of  yellow in “normal” trichromatic humans. But it may have a 
different power or disposition relative to dichromatic or tetrochromatic humans. and 
since it reflects in the ultraviolet range, it will have yet a different disposition relative to 
the birds that see ultraviolet light. there will be as many causal dispositions as there are 
distinct visual systems! to say simply that it has a disposition leaves out an important 
fact—that dispositions are always relative to perceivers. 
ii. thE fitnEss modEl: Evolutionary valuEs as rElations
the value of  evolution in understanding human behavior lies partly in the fact that 
it provides a general account of  organic phenomena that is not subject to the errors 
that may arise from a narrow focus on the human point of  view, or an outdated and 
mistaken way of  conceiving human nature.8 What evolution tells us is that valuation is 
relational in a manner similar to color perception. this is apparent in darwin’s formu-
lation of  his theory in 1859 (emphasis added). 
it may be said that natural selection is daily and hourly scrutinizing, throughout 
the world, every variation, even the slightest; rejecting that which is bad, preserving 
and adding up all that is good; silently and insensibly working, whenever and 
wherever opportunity offers, at the improvement of  each organic being in relation 
to its organic and inorganic conditions of  life. (darwin:84)
here darwin is laying out the basic idea behind natural selection—the concept of  fit-
ness. on this conception of  evolutionary value, an organism is good—fit—insofar as it 
functions well with respect to survival and reproduction in a particular environment. 
and a trait makes an organism good or fit, insofar as it assists in the functioning that 
supports survival and reproduction in the relevant environments.  Ernst mayr echoes darwin 
when he tell us that in selection,
…the “goodness” of  the new individual is constantly tested, from the larval (or 
embryonic) stage until adulthood and its period of  reproduction. those individuals 
who are most efficient in coping with the challenges of  the environment and 
in competing with other members of  their population and with those of  other 
species will have the best chance to survive until the age or reproduction and 
to reproduce successfully. numerous experiments and observations have revealed 
that certain individuals with particular attributes are clearly superior to others 
during this process of  elimination. they are the ones that are “fittest to survive.” 
7. this seems to be the strategy first adopted by galileo, Boyle and locke. see hilbert:4-5.
8. We are not, for instance, tempted to start with Platonic, Kantian or religious presuppositions about what 
value must be like, based on their respective ways of  misunderstanding human nature. 
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(mayr:119-120)
the widespread acceptance of  this relational fitness conception of  goodness is so com-
plete that no competent biologist would deny it. 
the logical structure of  this fitness conception of  goodness is apparent in the ways 
we talk about fitness. no evolutionist says that traits like feathers are simply good. rather 
they are good in particular ways for particular organisms and in particular contexts or 
environments. We recognize, for instance, that while feathers may be good for pen-
guins—who use them as insulation in cold climates, they would not be good for tape-
worms in the tapeworm environment—the gastrointestinal tracts of  other organisms. 
What this basic fitness concept implies is that a trait (morphological, behavioral, etc.) 
can be good for an organism with respect to some way of  functioning for that organism 
in an environment. on this basis, we can schematize ‘goodness’ in the following ways:
Simple Valuation Schema: “w is good (or bad) with respect to x for y in 
z.” 
here w is a trait, x is a way of  functioning (relative to factors relevant to survival and 
reproduction), y is an organism, or group or kind of  organism, and z is a context/envi-
ronment, type of  environment, or range of  environments. there is also a derivative, 
comparative schema: 
Comparative Valuation Schema: “v is better (or worse) than w with 
respect to x for y in z.” 
here v and w are alternative traits, and judgment is relative to the comparative good-
ness of  traits. this kind of  goodness is most relevant to selection processes. notice that 
we can use these schemata to evaluate more than just traits in the narrow sense—as 
features of  organisms. We can also evaluate organisms in terms of  overall phenotypic 
fitness by instantiating appropriately: “phenotype w is good with respect to survival 
and reproduction for y in z”; and “phenotype v is better/worse than phenotype w with 
respect to survival and reproduction for y in z”. and we can evaluate external objects 
and environments. a rock can be good with respect to cracking nuts for humans, a 
particular stick or gum wrapper can be good for male bower birds in enticing females, a 
shell can be good for a hermit crab with respect to its shape, and a sunken ship may be 
good for an eel with respect to all its hiding places. in the grand evolutionary scheme, 
objects and environments have value in the same way that morphological and behav-
ioral traits have value. 
What has value—is good or bad—in all these cases will be determined by what 
“matters”, or could matter, to a subject.9 since there is an indefinite number of  ways 
that something might matter, it is hard to be very precise here, but the most obvious way 
something might matter, and therefore have value or disvalue, is by direct implication 
for survival and reproduction. this is how feathers matter to birds. But mattering is not 
9. i am following Peter railton here in his account of  ethical value. as he explains, valuation is grounded 
on “mattering”. “it seems to me that notions like good and bad have a place in the scheme of  things only in 
virtue of  facts about what matters, or could matter, to beings for whom it is possible that something could 
matter.” (railton:2003:47)
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limited to that which has direct implications for survival and reproduction. something 
has value or disvalue if  it might matter—can potentially affect survival and reproduc-
tion in some possible context. so what is usually regarded as having non-instrumental 
value such as pleasure, will matter or could matter, because feelings of  pleasure might 
have implications for the reinforcement of  certain behaviors,10 that might in turn have 
implications for survival and reproduction. consequently, mattering and value can get 
grounded on things like the pleasure social creatures get from the company of  others, 
the enjoyment carnivores get from play, and the satisfaction philosophers get from solv-
ing philosophical puzzles. in generally, anything that has some potential effect on the 
subject can have value or disvalue to that subject. in the end, what matters to a subject, 
and therefore has value, is an open question, one answerable by empirical investigation 
into the nature of  subjects and the environments in which they live. 
What is important here is that first, these valuation schemata have relational struc-
tures that correctly represent all that is important for valuation in nature. Whether long 
necks are really good for giraffes, depends on how they function relative to the nature of  
giraffes, and the relevant environments—and for the functioning of  selection, the pres-
ence of  alternative traits. second, the semantics of  valuation—how we instantiate the 
variables—allows us to make the required distinctions. a trait may be good with respect 
to one kind of  functioning, but not good with respect to another. long necks may be 
good for browsing, but not for cardiovascular functioning. (it is not easy pumping blood 
to such heights.) furthermore, long necks will be good in this way only relative to some 
environmental conditions—the presence of  trees of  a certain kind, height and density.
third, it is also important to see that valuation will have different degrees of  gen-
erality relative to each of  the variables. relative to the x’s: some kinds of  mattering are 
more general in terms of  overall survival capabilities, while others are more narrow. the 
highly specialized gastrointestinal system of  the Panda, for instance, functions well in a 
narrow way, facilitating the digestion of  some species of  bamboo. But it functions poor-
ly in a broad way in that it functions well only relative to the digestion of  this bamboo. 
relative to the y’s: some kinds of  mattering may be good for a single individual organ-
ism or for a group of  organisms, or multiple life forms.11 a trait or behavior could be 
good, for instance, for a single ant, an ant colony, an ant species or an entire ecosystem. 
relative to the z’s: mattering can be with respect to narrowly prescribed environments 
or a wide range of  environments. the digestive apparatus of  mice, for instance, allows 
them to eat a wide variety of  foods from a wide variety of  sources. they are therefore 
good (function well) in this respect in a wide variety of  environmental contexts. 
fourth, we should recognize that while goodness (value) is subjective—it relates 
mattering to subjects—and something is therefore good only relative to a subject, good-
ness is also objective: whether a particular trait is good or bad in some particular way, 
is a factual and empirical matter. something is not good or bad just because someone 
10. this is an insight derived from hocutt, who identifies the good with that which reinforces. 
(hocutt:2000:113-134)
11. this kind of  generality is most obvious in kin selection and coevolution. 
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thinks it is. the objectivity of  valuation is supported in the strongest possible way—by 
consequences for life, reproduction and death. Just as no evolutionary biologist would 
deny the objective facts of  fitness, no philosopher should deny the objective facts of  
valuation. and we need look only to our own conditions of  life to discover this good-
ness or badness relative to our own functioning. Evidence is found in the advertised 
remedies for back pain, sinus headaches, myopia and obesity related problems. and we 
can observe the valuational facts in our pets, their joint problems, diabetes, and all the 
breeding related flaws.12 What is important is that value judgments in the form of  these 
valuation schemata will have truth values in a straightforward way, and with no less 
objective certainty than the facts of  life and death. 
finally, and most significantly, there will be regularities in mattering relations and 
valuation. feathers function similarly in similar species—whether to assist in locomo-
tion through gaseous environments or as insulation against the cold of  polar environ-
ments. We can therefore formulate value generalizations of  varying degrees. this fact 
is, of  course, something we already recognize. We are all aware that long fur and blub-
ber function well in cold environments. the relational conception of  valuation gives us 
a framework within which we can formulate these generalizations, and see what they 
involve—reference to ways of  mattering, the nature of  the subjects, and environments. 
in the introduction, i claimed that values are complex relational facts. We are now 
in a position to clarify this. i have so far been concerned primarily with valuation and 
not values per se. this is because valuation is fundamental, and whatever values are, 
they are derivative of, and based on valuation. this is a consequence of  the naturalistic 
starting point. But since the term ‘value’ gets used in many ways—sometimes just to 
refer to beliefs or attitudes about value, it is worth specifying what values are on this 
relational approach. as i see it, values are best understood as the patterns of  valuation 
that are brought out in the relational valuation propositions. Whatever i may believe 
about the value of  long necks, opposable thumbs, or trichromatic color vision for vari-
ous subjects, there are facts about how these traits function for their possessors and 
in various environments. these facts are values, as are the patterns of  functioning. 
consequently, there may be individual, group, species and even supra-specific values. 
the well functioning of  bipedalism for primates in certain environments, for instance, 
constitutes a supra-specific value. 
the implication of  this concept of  value is that there is no simple fact/value dis-
tinction. rather there are value facts and non-value facts. value facts are about things 
that matter to subjects—and consequently have the relational logical structure i have 
schematized here. non-value facts make no reference to what matters for subjects, and 
consequently have a different logical structure. We should, on the view presented here, 
12. in richards (1997), i argue that darwin thought that the flaws produced in domestic breeding could be 
used as experimental evidence for the functioning of  natural selection in eliminating the unfit—the worse 
forms. darwin thought we observed this disvalue in the browsing of  the highly bred niata cattle of  la 
Plata. in effect, the value of  domestic breeding was partly found in the fact that it tended to produce bad 
traits in domestic breeds. 
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recognize the existence of  such valuation facts as part of  our basic description of  the 
natural world.
iii. human Ethical valuEs
how does this general account of  valuation apply to ethical values? the start-
ing point is the insight that ethical values are found in social mattering. in evolutionary 
terms, our ethical practices and moral sentiments are adaptations to help us survive 
and reproduce in our social environments. if  so, then an individual is good with respect 
to some social functioning in social environments, and a trait, behavior, action, etc. is 
good or bad in various ways for specified individuals in specified contexts. What this 
implies is that social goodness is found in the semantics of  valuation: what counts as 
having ethical value or disvalue depends on how we instantiate the variables. in order 
to have social value, a trait must function well in social contexts—environments where 
the social interaction with other humans matters. Politeness, language skills, sense of  
humor, etc. typically function in this way. We can restrict the instantiation of  variables 
in the schemata to reflect this social mattering: 
Simple (Social) Valuation Schema: “w is (socially) good (or bad) with 
respect to x for y in z.” 
Comparative (Social) Valuation Schema: “v is (socially) better (or worse) 
than w with respect to x for y in z.”
here v and w are traits (behaviors, tendencies, sentiments, desires, motives, etc.), x is 
some kind of  social mattering, y is a social creature or group of  creatures, and z is a 
social context. 
as with valuation in general, it is difficult to say with precision what might matter 
socially and therefore have social value or disvalue. But there are obvious examples: 
“Wearing clothes satisfies privacy needs of  southern Baptists in church.” or: “lying 
creates distrust among family members in the family contexts of  western cultures.” 
the valuation schemata do not, however, try to distinguish instances of  social function-
ing that are obviously ethical from those that are not. certainly we need to be able to 
make this distinction. the behavior of  serial murderers is bad in a way that violations 
of  mere etiquette are not. to do this satisfactorily will require some sort of  natural-
istic theory of  normativity and obligation. i shall not try to say here what this would 
involve. nonetheless, we can still see that some ways of  functioning have more at stake 
because of  the kind of  mattering at issue. for instance, it is more important biologi-
cally and socially for a parent to support the functioning of  their children with respect 
to food and shelter, than it is with regard to providing them with fashionable footwear. 
consequently, we generally regard the failures of  parents to feed their children to have 
much greater disvalue than the failure to buy them the newest style of  shoe. this is 
a simple and straightforward way of  distinguishing the different kinds of  social mat-
tering—one kind has implications for survival of  offspring, the other does not. since 
the survival of  our offspring typically matters to us (biologically and psychologically), 
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there is a significance associated with this mattering that is not associated with social 
functioning that does not have such significant implications. Perhaps this kind of  social 
significance can ground a theory of  normativity that can in turn justify the “oughts” 
and “shoulds” of  normative ethics.
But whether or not a naturalistic theory of  normativity is possible13, we can see how 
our actual judgments about ethical valuation are often relational in this way. We do in 
fact condemn some behaviors of  some people, in some contexts, but not others. certain 
kinds of  sexual behavior, for instance, are fine for some consenting adults in some con-
texts, but are morally reprehensible in other contexts—with children, for example, or 
during church services and at restaurants. What is most important is how this rela-
tional approach allows us to make useful and necessary distinctions. first, the various 
schemata explicitly recognize that there may be conflict in function and value. a trait, 
behavior, or action may function well in one respect, but not another. helping socrates 
escape from prison may be good in that it saves a virtuous person from an undeserved 
punishment. But, as socrates recognized, this action may also have disvalue relative to 
other functions, in particular, the general respect for law. second, a trait, behavior or 
action might be good for some people but bad relative to others. robin hood’s redis-
tribution of  wealth from the rich to the poor might be good with respect to the wealth 
of  the poor, but it would be bad relative to the rich.14 third, as in general evolutionary 
valuation, there can be different degrees of  subjective generality. something can, in 
principle, be socially good relative to y’s of  different scope, from a single individual to 
a family, community, nation, or even an entire species.15 fourth, social functioning can 
also have different degrees of  generality relative to context. a trait, behavior, or action 
can be good in a single context or many. Killing other humans is bad in many contexts, 
but good in some cases of  self-defense. notice also that culture is part of  the context, 
so we can accommodate those cases where cultural relativism is appropriate. But since 
culture is only part of  environmental context, valuation cannot be reduced to a cultural 
relativism. fifth, the comparative schema makes it clear that in cases of  social mat-
tering (as in biological functioning) often we want to know more than whether a trait, 
behavior or action is simply good, we want to know if  it is better than the alternative. We 
not only want good functioning, we want the best functioning. this relational approach 
explicitly recognizes this fact.
finally, and highly significantly for practical purposes, we can formulate generaliza-
tions about social functioning. in similar social contexts, and for similar subjects, similar 
traits have similar value. violence within a nuclear family is dysfunctional in similar 
13. see hocutt:2000 for one promising approach that is consistent with this evolutionary account of  valu-
ation, but is not itself  based on evolution.
14. notice this redistribution may be bad in other respects relative to the poor as well—if  it promotes 
dependence or discourages individual initiative.
15. how an entire species could be benefited is a bit unclear, but possible in principle nonetheless. What is 
of  consequence here is that there can be different degrees of  “egoism”: if  an action benefits only me then 
it is most egoistic, but if  it benefits my family, community or species as well, it decreasingly egoistic- even 
though it still benefits me as part of  the group. 
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ways among families in alabama as well as in afghanistan. We can therefore formulate 
many ethical principles that will generally function in the same way—even if  there may 
be subjects or environments that are problematic. Just as we can formulate generaliza-
tions about the value of  feathers and hearts in various contexts, we can formulate gen-
eralizations, and consequently general rules about lying, killing, sexual behavior etc., 
but without being absolute (non-relational).16 on the other hand, many values will not 
be general in this way if  functioning depends on the particular facts of  the relevant rela-
tions. Whatever the case, the degree and nature of  value generalizations will depend 
on the particular ways the schemata are instantiated (the semantics of  valuation), and 
empirical facts about humans and their social environments.  
at this point, a caution is in order. no automatic and direct inferences can be made 
about the past or future selective value of  social traits on the basis of  any particular 
valuation. for instance, we cannot automatically infer that a sense of  humor has or will 
be favored by natural selection simply because it is socially good in some particular way, 
for some person, in some social context. most obviously this inference fails because a 
trait might be good in some respect, but bad in some other more important respect. or 
a trait may be good only in a narrowly specified environment, but bad in many oth-
ers. Even more importantly, that a trait is good in some way does not imply that it is 
better than the alternatives—as selection would require. finally we need to determine 
whether a phenotypic trait or behavior has some genetic basis that can be selected for. 
all these complications suggest that inferring the action of  natural selection from any 
particular case of  valuation is highly problematic. conversely, inferring valuation from 
the operation of  natural selection is also problematic. that a trait functions in particu-
lar way in the past does not imply that it continues to function that way. Xenophobia 
may have served humans well in an ancestral environment where strangers were likely 
to pose a significant risk. But it may serve us poorly in modern environments where the 
risk is small.
iv. a dEfEnsE of thE rElational concEPtion
the value theory developed here has something in common with other accounts of  
value. But each of  these accounts fails to get valuation quite right, primarily by exclud-
ing some kinds of  value. this failure is due, at least in part, to the fact that these accounts 
do not explicitly identify each of  the relevant factors through a valuation schema. the 
schemata presented here are useful in that they force us to recognize the full relational 
nature of  valuation, in all its varieties and relative to all the important variables. this is 
best understood by contrast with some similar, yet more limited value theories. 
i borrowed the term ‘mattering’ from Peter railton to identify the sorts of  things 
that might have value. he has used this notion to develop a naturalistic and relational 
16. these generalizations can be useful not just in formulating moral rules of  thumb, but also in underwrit-
ing predictions about social behavior. People tend to act in ways that seem to be good for them in particular 
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account of  value, arguing that ethical value originates in mattering.
We begin by thinking of  value as essentially subjective, arising from mattering. in 
any nonmetaphorical sense of  mattering, we should be able to fill in the formula 
“x matters to y for G.“ (railton: 105)
this account is relational in that mattering is relativized to subjects—the “y” in the 
schema presented. But as his schema also makes clear, it is not relativized to environ-
ment or context. this is an important omission. Just as feathers are good only in some 
environments, so are many social behaviors and actions. While there is no obvious 
reason why railton could not consistently relativize his conception of  value to environ-
ment or context, he does not explicitly do so. 
there are other differences as well. first, railton’s focus is on human value and he 
does not seem to be interested in a general, non-anthropocentric theory of  value. as far 
as i can see, there is no reason he could not give a more general theory, but the starting 
point in human value may have consequences not found in an approach that begins in 
evolutionary value in general. an anthropocentric theory may come to overemphasize 
the role of  distinctly human traits—conscious belief  and reason for instance.17 second, 
even though railton recognizes that valuation is relational, he still seems intent on con-
ceiving goodness as a property.
i will argue for a form of  moral realism that holds that moral judgments can bear 
truth values in a fundamentally nonepistemic sense of  truth; that moral properties 
are objective, though relational, that moral properties supervene upon natural 
properties, and may be reducible to them; that moral inquiry is of  a piece with 
empirical inquiry… (railton:5)
While there is much i agree with here, i find railton’s claim that there are moral prop-
erties that “supervene” on, and may be reducible to, natural properties puzzling at best. 
nonetheless, railton’s commitments here may seem appealing to those who want to 
save the property conception by appealing to “supervenience.” according to this strat-
egy, the property of  goodness supervenes on other properties. What value superveni-
ence involves here is not exactly clear, but it seems to imply that the goodness of  a thing 
is dependent on its natural properties, but is still distinct from (and usually not reducible 
to) those properties.18 this is the approach typically advocated by those who think that 
goodness is a property like color.19 But since this supervenience relation is usually under-
17. max hocutt, although he focuses on normativity rather than value, advocates a similarly relational 
theory of  value in his Grounded Ethics (2000) like railton’s, his interests are narrower than those here. he 
focuses on human value from within a behavioral and cultural context. goodness, for him, is that which 
reinforces, and is always dependent on “desire”. (hocutt:6) While his views, like railton’s, could be made 
consistent with the more general approach developed here, it is nonetheless, narrower by virtue of  a non 
evolutionary starting point.  
18. railton is unusual in postulating a reducible supervenience. most accounts of  supervenience postu-
late nonreducibility. savallos and yalcin claim that the basic notion of  supervenience involves covariance, 
dependence, determination and non-reducibility. after Jaegwon Kim, the standard view is that superveni-
ence is a relation between properties. (savallos:1995:2)
19. railton argues that goodness is not so much like color, but taste. see his “red, Bitter good” in 
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stood to be among properties and does not include reference to a subject and context, 
the appeal to supervenience is neither helpful, nor harmless. it is not helpful in that 
it simply excludes the factors that are often most important in our deliberation about 
value—the nature of  the subject and the context. We simply cannot decide whether 
something is good or bad until we know for whom it is good or bad, and the relevant 
context. it is harmful in that it may mislead us about the nature of  value, implying that 
valuation is independent of  subject and context. 
railton’s commitments in this passage suggest another way to save the property con-
ception of  value—via relational properties. goodness is then a property of  an ordered 
set of  variables: the trait in question, the manner of  functioning, the subject and the 
environment. i have no objection to this, as long as the necessary factors are included 
in the relation, and the property is understood to be of  the ordered variables, not of  a single 
variable—the trait or thing in question. similarly, we might try to save the property 
conception of  value by conceiving goodness as a causal power. once again, as long as 
we conceive this causal power as a relation between the thing that has the causal power, 
the thing that is affected by it, and the circumstances under which it has the power, then 
i have no objection.
another theory of  value that has something in common with the approach advo-
cated here, is developed by Philippa foot, who, like railton, proposes a naturalistic and 
relational theory. But unlike railton, her theory is explicitly general. she argues that 
value in non-human species is the same sort of  thing as value in humans. 
…i believe that evaluations of  human will and action share a conceptual structure 
with evaluations of  characteristics and operations of  other living things, and can 
only be understood in these terms. i want to show moral evil as ‘a kind of  natural 
defect’. life will be at the centre of  my discussion, and the fact that a human 
action or disposition is good of  its kind will be taken to be simply a fact about a 
given feature of  a certain kind of  living thing. to make such a suggestion, as i 
interpret it, is to contemplate a naturalistic theory of  ethics. (foot:2001:5)
But, as friendly as this view is to my own approach, it diverges at a key point. foot iden-
tifies value only relative to abstracted life cycles of  species in abstracted environments, 
and not in the many other ways something can matter—be good or bad in all sorts of  
environments. this comes out in how she relates goodness to “aristotelian necessities.”
…it is necessary for plants to have water, for birds to build nests, for wolves to hunt 
in packs, and for lionesses to teach their cubs to kill. these ‘aristotelian necessities’ 
depend on what the particular species of  plant and animals need, on their natural 
habitat, and the ways of  making out that are in their repertoire. these things 
together determine what it is for members of  a particular species to be as they 
should be, and to do that which they should do. (foot:2001:15) 
While i have no objection to her proposal that we can and should consider goodness 
relative to species-specific life cycles and in particular “natural habitats”, these are not 
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the only considerations relevant to valuation. something can matter—have value rela-
tive to an individual in an atypical way, (non-species specific) and in an atypical (“non-
natural”) environment, and an adequate theory of  value must be able to accommodate 
these facts. if  we regard “aristotelian necessities” as the basis of  valuation, then we can-
not clearly distinguish the many ways that things matter independently of  ‘aristotelian 
necessities’ and natural habitats. 
at bottom, this problem with foot’s conception of  value seems to originate in her 
essentialist tendencies to focus on the “teleology of  the species” over all the contingen-
cies of  existence that are emphasized by evolutionary theory (emphasis added). 
We start from the fact that it is the particular life form of  a species of  plant or animal 
that determines how an individual plant or animal should be: the aristotelian 
categoricals give the ‘how’ of  what happens in the life cycle of  that species. And all 
the truths about what this or that characteristic does, what its purpose or point is, and in suitable 
cases its function, must be related to this life cycle... We could say, therefore, that part of  
what distinguishes an aristotelian categorical from a mere statistical proposition 
about some or most of  all members of  a kind of  living thing is the fact that it 
relates to the teleology of  the species. (foot:2001:32-3) 
it is not insignificant that in her Natural Goodness, she mentions evolution just in two 
footnotes (foot:2001:32,40) and only to reject the possibility that evolution can provide 
insight into values. 
a third approach that also has something in common with the theory of  value 
developed here, is presented by William casebeer in his Natural Ethical Facts: Evolution, 
Connectionism and Moral Cognition. this is a naturalistic and relational approach to value 
(albeit without an explicit value schema), but it focuses more on the cognitive aspects 
of  ethics. it has many virtues, but suffers from some of  the same limitations of  foot’s 
approach. in particular, while valuation is relational, it is indexed only to a particu-
lar kind of  functioning, what casebeer describes as a “modern history” concept of  
functioning. he quotes Peter godfrey-smith with approval: “functions are dispositions 
and powers which explain the recent maintenance of  a trait in a selective context.” 
(casebeer:52) the basic idea is that something is good or bad relative to the recent 
selective environments that are responsible for its presence. 
it is not too difficult to see that this is a limited sense of  value. something might 
matter in a positive or negative way without being part of  a selection based explana-
tion for its presence. in other words, something can be good or bad independently of  
any recent evolutionary function. casebeer seems to fall into the same aristotelian trap 
that caught foot, limiting value to a particular kind of  “proper” functioning. he virtu-
ally admits as much, describing his own view as a “pragmatic neo-aristotelian virtue 
theory.” (casebeer:2) By limiting value in this way, he cannot recognize the full range 
of  respects with which something might matter independently of  modern history func-
tion. it is not clear, for instance, that the enjoyment i get from solving a philosophical 
puzzle, or hearing an opera aria sung well, admits a recent evolutionary function. if  
so, then this kind of  mattering could not have value on casebeer’s approach. nor can 
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he recognize the full range of  environments that may affect mattering. But surely we 
can say something is good or bad relative to environments that did not affect past selec-
tion—in particular, the many social and cultural environments that are of  too recent 
origin to affect our evolutionary development. this is not insignificant. the recent 
selective environments of  humans did not include the cities and towns we now live in. 
it is not clear how casebeer’s theory of  value can help us understand mattering in a 
modern city. in the end, we need a theory that can accommodate the full range of  mat-
tering, and casebeer’s cannot. 
furthermore, casebeer, like railton, apparently cannot abandon the property con-
ception of  value, and its associated supervenience strategy, arguing: 
functional properties are not “strange” or “odd” properties that could not 
supervene on matter in any comprehensible way. rather functional properties 
are interesting and conceptually tractable, and they can serve a useful purpose in 
scientific theories, particularly in the biological sciences. (casebeer:53)
But i see no reason why casebeer cannot think of  functions and value in fully relational 
terms, so it is unfortunate that he ignores his own suspicions about supervenience: 
…that mere supervenience relations, though acceptable in a developing science, 
often are used as an excuse not to explore the phenomena in question in more 
depth, or, in the worst of  cases, merely restate a problematic relation rather than 
“solving” it. (casebeer:11)
casebeer would have been better off  recognizing the fully relational nature of  function—
and more broadly value—and avoid the property conception of  value altogether.
there is one last difference between the relational conception and the theories 
advanced by railton, foot and casebeer. Each of  these thinkers has a tendency to 
postulate the existence of  some “the good” for an individual (and a species) as if  there 
is a set of  things that constitutes a single, coherent, encompassing good. for railton it 
is found in a set of  “objective interests” (railton:2003:11); for foot it is to be found in 
the aristotelian necessities; and for casebeer it is found in the modern history func-
tions. But once we recognize that goodness is always relative to respects, subjects, and 
environments, and we recognize there always will be systematic conflict in the various 
ways of  being good, it is clear that there is no “the good” in this sense for any single 
individual, group or species. there are just many different, independent and often con-
flicting goods.
there are some obvious objections to the evolutionary and relational conception 
of  value advocated here. first, many will argue that the relational conception makes 
morality subjective because valuation is always in relation to subjects and contexts. this 
conclusion is correct. But i hope it is clear by now that values are also objective in the 
sense that they are based on facts about mattering. We should also recognize that even 
though we may want absolute, non-relational values, there are many things we want 
but cannot have (immortality and less dysfunctional sinuses for instance), and that we 
may want them does not imply that they exist. nor is it even clear that we really want 
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and actual valuation? ultimately, don’t we want norms and rules that function well, to 
make us function well, relative to both our natures and the situations in which we find 
ourselves? absolute, universal (non-relational) values cannot be responsive to the facts 
of  our existence. 
nonetheless, an implication of  this subjectivity is that seemingly monstrous acts can 
still be good. torturing children for fun might be good for the torturer with respect to 
the pleasure it brings. once again this conclusion is correct. But this is only one small 
part of  the picture. not only would the torturing likely be bad in many ways for the 
children tortured, it would also likely be bad for the torturer in many ways and con-
texts. it might, for instance, have psychological effects that reduce the torturer’s ability 
to function in human societies. and certainly if  other humans knew of  the torturing, 
they would be unlikely to trust and respect the torturer. furthermore, torturing chil-
dren would likely be bad for a community in many ways in the patterns of  interaction 
learned by those who were affected. the bottom line is this: once we see the many ways 
such actions would be bad for the torturer, the children tortured, and others, we can see 
that this narrow goodness relative to the torturer’s pleasure is trivial. 
i hope it is clear by now that this relational account of  value it is not relativistic or 
subjective in the usual sense. first, it is not a cultural relativism nor is it purely subjective. 
that is to say that things are not good or bad only relative to a culture or individual. 
since culture is part of  the human social environment, some things will be good or bad 
relative to culture. driving on the right side of  the street is good with respect to safety 
and efficiency in the united states, because it conforms with conventions and expecta-
tions. But it would be bad on similar grounds in great Britain. and since valuation is 
subjective, some things will be good or bad relative to a single individual. Just as a flavor 
of  ice cream may be good with respect to the pleasure it brings, a particular sexual 
preference or way of  life may be good or bad with respect to the pleasure it brings. But 
many valuations will not be dependent on cultural context or subjective preference in 
these ways. necrophilia is bad in many ways relative to the health of  those who engage 
in it—regardless of  cultural values or subjective preference. furthermore, the fact that 
the ethical facts are relational does not imply they are mere opinion, as many philoso-
phers assume.20 
finally, non-naturalists might object that this approach to valuation simply leaves 
out the non-natural, it does not establish that there are no non-natural valuational prop-
erties. this is partly correct. i do not think it is possible to prove that there are no non-
natural values, any more than it is possible to prove there are no Platonic forms—even 
though it is unclear how we could have good empirical grounds for believing in things 
like Platonic forms. nonetheless it is possible to draw out the problems of  a theory 
of  non-natural values. one problem for the non-naturalist here is how to answer the 
following questions: first, why should valuation be different—have a different logical 
form—for humans than for other creatures? if  valuation is not different, then there 
20. Elliott sober for instance: “…so called ethical relativists say that murder is right or wrong only because 
various people in a society have come to believe it is.” (sober:135)
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would need to be non-natural values for all creatures. if  it is different, then the non-
naturalist has to give an account how there are non-natural values, but only for humans. 
Either way, the non-naturalist must provide an account of  how we come to have and 
know these values! Whatever the case, my purpose here is not to refute non-naturalist 
approaches, but to give a naturalistic account that better explains actual valuation. 
there are many loose ends here that i cannot address, but that are clearly in need 
of  analysis. We need to say more about how we can distinguish ethical mattering from 
non-ethical, and how that might make a naturalistic theory of  normativity possible. 
then there are a series of  philosophical questions to be addressed about the nature of  
value relations: What sorts of  things are these value relations? What metaphysical and 
epistemic issues, questions and problems do they raise?21 While these questions must 
ultimately be answered, i cannot do so here.
v. thE othEr sidE of Error thEory
in the introduction, i agreed with the error theory advanced by michael ruse. 
according to ruse our ethical systems are adaptations to facilitate our social behavior, 
and there is nothing further to serve as absolute justification for our ethical values—our 
systems of  normative ethics.
What i want to argue is that there are no foundations to normative ethics. if  you 
think that to be true a claim has to refer to some particular thing or things, my claim 
is that in an important sense, normative ethics is false… the claims of  normative 
ethics are like the rules of  a game. in baseball, it is true that after three strikes 
the batter is out; but this claim does not have any reference or correspondence in 
absolute reality. (ruse:1995:248-9)
so while the claim that “killing is wrong” may be true or false by reference to the ethical 
game (ruse:1995:271), it is not true or false by reference to some absolute value or set 
of  values. But, according to ruse, when we say things like “killing is wrong” we mean it 
in some absolute, non-relational way. this is the error.
to use a useful if  ugly word of  mackie (1979), we ‘objectify’ morality. We think that 
killing is wrong because it seems to us that killing is wrong. somehow whatever the 
truth may be, the foundation of  morality does seem to be something ‘out there’ 
binding on us. (ruse:1995:254) 
the explanation for this error is simple. as ruse puts it: “We need to believe in moral-
ity, and so, thanks to our biology, we do believe in morality.” (ruse:1995:250) the idea 
is that the belief  in the objective foundations of  normative ethics makes us more likely 
to follow the normative rules that we accept. if  i were to believe that killing is wrong 
only relative to some game, rather than absolutely wrong, then i am less likely to take 
the prohibition of  murder seriously. in short, the adaptive benefit of  belief  in morality 
is enhanced by the false belief  in its absolute nature.
21. david armstrong raises some of  these questions, but recognizes that there has been insufficient philo-
sophical work done on them. (armstrong:1978:75)
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this belief  in an absolute moral foundation is not the only error. as should be clear 
by now, the tendency to think of  moral judgment as simple predication is also an error. the 
claim that “killing is wrong” is not just an error in its assumption of  absolute founda-
tion, but also in its assumed logical structure. moral judgments are better understood 
relationally: “killing is wrong with respect to x, for y in context z.” this is reinforced 
by the fact that we recognize that killing is appropriate in many cases of  self-defense. 
similarly, “lying is wrong” is better formulated in one of  the valuation schema i have 
outlined above: “lying is worse than telling the truth with respect to x for y in z.” 
this logical error has implications for attributions of  truth value. the cognitivism/
non-cognitivism debate has focused on whether moral judgments have truth values in 
the ordinary sense. if  my analysis is correct, then we can see why moral judgments do 
not have truth value in their uncorrected form, but do in the corrected logical form. 
this is revealed by the analogy between the predications “x is good” and “x is tall”. 
When we say of  a person that they are tall, we seem to be predicating of  him or her, the 
simple property of  “being tall”. But what we are typically saying is that some person is 
taller than those in a reference class. By “x is tall”, for instance, we might mean “x is tall-
er than the average alabamian,” “x is taller than the median for women,” or “x is taller 
than the other 12 year olds.” But it is clear that there is nothing like just being tall. tall 
is a comparative predicate. consequently, the sentence “x is tall” will not have a truth 
value, because it is ill-formed—it lacks the other comparative term. it is equivalent to 
the fragment: “x is taller than…”. here it is obvious that we cannot assign a truth value 
until we complete the sentence. similarly, good and bad are relational predicates, and 
the fragment “w is good…” will not have a truth value until we complete the sentence: 
“w is good with respect to x, for y in z.” once we complete the valuational sentence, it 
can have a truth value, but not before.
an adequate error theory demands an explanation for the error. i can hardly pro-
vide one here. nonetheless, we can see how it might be useful to think of  relations as 
simple predications. if  someone is taller than some implied comparative class, we think 
that person to have some property of  being tall. likewise, if  something tastes good, 
we tend to think that it has some property of  “good flavor,” rather than thinking it is 
related to our tastes in such a way that it is pleasurable. if  we find some action mor-
ally offensive, we think the action has the property of  being morally offensive. this 
sort of  strategy is useful in everyday life, because what we need to know for biological 
and social functioning is how things are good or bad for ourselves in general ways, and in the 
contexts we generally find ourselves. a fast (and dirty) way to do this is by projecting value or 
disvalue onto the things themselves that tend to function in certain ways relative to us.22 
the value of  this strategy is obvious. suppose we are looking for dinner and encounter 
a patch of  “death cap” mushrooms. it may be true that such mushrooms function well 
in different ways for different creatures, in various contexts, but this is more than we 
usually need to know. What we need to know is that they would be a bad, deadly, meal 
22. similarly, a fast and easy way to make color judgments is by projecting the color onto a thing—thinking 
of  it as a property of  that thing.
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for us. We are better off  if  we focus on that fact, than if  we allow ourselves to be dis-
tracted by the many different ways “death caps” can function relative to other creatures. 
in other words, we can and should ignore the irrelevant relational facts. this can be 
done relatively easy by thinking of  the mushrooms as being deadly—having a property 
of  deadliness. this simple judgment is adequate for our purposes, and much easier to 
apply than the relational judgment in all its complexity. similarly when confronted with 
a hungry lion, we are better off  thinking that the lion is simply dangerous. the person 
who pauses to consider all the ways a lion is good or bad relative to various subjects 
and contexts, will likely be good for the lion relative to taste and nutritive benefits. By 
contrast, the person who incorrectly believes the simple predication “the lion is dan-
gerous” is more likely to live another day to incorrectly believe other similar, simple 
predications. similarly, it is useful to think that someone who poses a threat to me (or a 
group i belong to), has the property of  being “bad” or “evil”. if  i think of  him as evil, 
i will have a useful attitude towards him—an attitude that will cause me to avoid him. 
it will also be useful to believe that someone who behaves in ways that benefit me (or 
a group i belong to) has the property of  being “good.” We also need a fast and easy 
way to evaluate actions, rules and sentiments relative to human social functioning. one 
good way to make these quick judgments is through simple predication: certain actions 
are simply bad, and others are simply good. this works if  the relevant actions, rules 
and sentiments function in sufficiently general ways relative to us and the circumstances 
we find ourselves.23 in other words, it is often useful to think that good actions have the 
property of  being good—they have “goodness”, while bad actions have “badness”. 
vi. conclusion
there are two main reasons to adopt the relational conception of  value present-
ed here. first it gets valuation right. it corrects and clarifies our conception of  value, 
revealing its deep logical structure. this structure is apparent from the understanding 
that evolutionary theory gives us of  valuation in general. for those who want to postu-
late another source of  value, the burden is on them to show how it might arise. 
second, this conception is better able to explain human ethical behavior. it reveals 
what is subjective and what is objective in valuation. and it shows that just because 
value is relational to subjects, it is not therefore a matter of  opinion. there can be facts 
about valuation, just as there can be facts about mattering. the relational conception 
of  valuation also gives us a framework for understanding the semantics of  value—how 
we instantiate the variables. We can consciously consider the different ways something 
can be good, for whom it is good and the contexts in which it is good. this highlights 
what is empirical in evaluation—facts about mattering, subjects and contexts. We can-
not determine what is good by a priori philosophizing. 
23. if  we cannot generalize mattering in this way, then we would be less likely to make these property attri-
butions. in other words, if  an action is sometimes good and sometimes bad in common contexts, then we 
don’t tend to thing of  it as either being good or bad. 
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this framework also makes it clear why moral reasoning is often complicated and 
contentious. there is great complexity in social functioning, and it is often not obvi-
ous how a particular trait, behavior or action will matter relative to a single subject or 
various sets of  subjects in a variety of  contexts. one source of  ethical disagreement is 
therefore to be found in the fact that there are empirical disputes about well functioning. 
there is also a political element: many ethical disputes are ultimately over who benefits 
from the functioning of  particular traits, behaviors and actions. that an action or rule 
benefits me over you is a good reason for me to prefer it, and you to abhor it. Ethical dis-
putes can also be about how the different ways of  being good and bad get balanced. a 
particular action can be good in one respect but bad relative to another. Killing a child 
murderer may be good relative to the fact that this person is eliminated, but it may be 
bad in other ways. since many, if  not all, actions will be both good and bad in different 
respects, we typically must weigh the competing valuations, and we may disagree about 
how the various options balance out. 
We can explain agreement on this account as well. first, as our error theory sug-
gests, the fact that we think of  value in terms of  simple predication implies that we 
often simply suppress some of  the potential sources of  dispute by ignoring the relational 
structure of  valuation, and the factors that would be expected to produce disagreement. 
thinking of  value in property terms hides the relational aspects of  value that are likely 
to cause disagreement—conflict relative to different respects and subjects. But also, 
many things are good for groups of  subjects, and are therefore good in some way for 
all or most of  those in the group. if  truth telling benefits everyone in the group, then 
all those in the group have a good reason to value truth telling. they will have a reason 
to agree. 
this model also reveals the limits of  ethical discourse. on the property conception 
of  value, consensus is achievable in principle by pointing to the particular goodness or 
badness of  a thing or action.24 then once we all see that it is good or bad, we can agree 
about its value—and decide whether it should be pursued. But if  value is relative to 
respects, subjects and contexts, as i argue here, there will be ineliminable conflicts in 
value judgments. it is inevitable that there will be actions or rules that are good for me 
and bad for you, and nothing can change that fact. in these cases, we can arrive at a 
consensus only if  one of  us is mistaken about the valuational facts.25
notice that this relational conception makes sense of  moore’s “open question” 
argument. moore argued that it is always an open question whether or not some natu-
ral property like pleasure was good. he concluded that therefore we cannot simply 
define goodness in terms of  natural properties like pleasure. But if  value is relational, as 
24. this hope does not demand that we be able to recognize or perceive goodness directly. We might be 
able to do this indirectly by pointing to the properties that the goodness or badness depend on. 
25. the obvious mistake is to think that the action or rule or thing has some property that makes it good in 
a non-relational way. We can incorporate this possibility into our error theory: the property conception of  
value can facilitate social functioning by causing us to believe that something is good in itself  and therefore 
good for everyone.
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i argue here, of  course the goodness of  any particular property will be an open ques-
tion. We need to know the respect in which it is supposed to be good, and for whom and 
under what conditions it is supposed to be good.
there is an additional way this conception of  valuation may be useful, although i 
can only gesture toward it here. if  i am right and valuation should be conceived in rela-
tional, and not property terms, then those philosophical debates that have been prem-
ised on the property conception of  value will need to be revisited in light of  this fact. as 
already suggested, we might doubt the value or necessity of  value theories that postulate 
supervenience. But we might also look critically at the debates about intrinsic value. if  
intrinsic value is conceived in property terms, then we might have something to say here 
as well. Whatever the case, there are, i believe, significant philosophical consequences 
for how we conceive value. We need to get our value concepts right.
richard a. richards 
university of  alabama
While these views, and any errors, are my own, i have benefited greatly from my discus-
sion of  these issues with my colleagues max hocutt and James otteson.
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